


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1974/11/09



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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November 9, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary Kissinger

FROM: Winston Lord
Arthur Hummel
Richard H. Solomon

SUBJECT: Briefing the President on Your
Forthcoming Trip to Peking

You will be briefing the President on your forthcoming trip to Peking. You will want to give Mr. Ford a sense of the range of topics you expect to pursue with PRC leaders, and also seek his guidance on the key question of further steps toward U.S.-PRC normalization.


Regarding the general purpose and agenda of the discussions in Peking, we suggest you make the following points to the President:

-- You should review with him the overall policy considerations which have underlain our normalization efforts to date, and the way U.S. interests will be served by completing the process of establishing diplomatic relations between the U.S. and PRC. Such matters are summarized in the briefing paper on U.S.-PRC relations which we prepared for Mr. Ford at the time of his inauguration. This paper, at Tab A, might be left with the President for his own review at this time.

-- The up-coming visit comes at a delicate time in the evolution of U.S.-PRC relations. We have had four years of fruitful exchanges, but there are now underlying questions of continuity of policy which will have to be explored. The Chinese, for example, have recently given some indication that they may be re-evaluating their position toward the Soviet Union. We doubt that they see it in their interest to bring about a major shift in their foreign policy, but we want to get a clearer picture of where they stand given the fact that a year has now passed since your last authoritative talks in Peking.

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
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-- You will review with PRC leaders the state of our negotiations with the Soviets on issues related to "detente" and SALT. In the past the Chinese have expressed serious misgivings about agreements we have reached with the Russians, and in view of the active level of Soviet-American official discussions this fall (which will culminate in the Vladivostok Summit, just before the Peking visit) the Chinese may be particularly on edge about our intentions toward Moscow and how this may affect their interests. In the past they have expressed concern that the U.S. would attempt to use its relationship with Peking to lever the Russians -- and in the process make the PRC more vulnerable to Soviet pressures. You want to lay any such concerns to rest.

-- In this regard, you will also want to reassure the Chinese about the continuity of U.S. policy of maintaining the capability and intention to counter any expansionist pressures from the Russians, and with respect to U.S.-PRC normalization. America's domestic political and economic difficulties -- which have had some influence on our ability to promote various foreign policies -- probably have given PRC leaders some doubts about the U.S. role in world affairs, and you intend to lay to rest as many of these doubts as possible. The recent increase in Democratic Party influence in Congress will not help, but at the same time this development may motivate the Chinese to consolidate their relationship with the U.S. while people they are accustomed to dealing with are still in office.

-- You also will review a wide range of world issues with the Chinese. You will explain to them the results of your recent trip to the Middle East, Asia, and Eastern Europe, and cover such related matters as the energy crisis and a world food policy. You will also review developments in Japan and Southeast Asia, including the results of the President's forthcoming visits to Tokyo and Seoul. You will explore with the Chinese any possibilities for movement on the issues of Cambodia and the U.N. Command in Korea.

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The most important topic for discussion with the President is next steps in the process of normalizing U.S.-PRC relations. [As background for this discussion we urge you to read the paper on the normalization issue which has been prepared for your trip book. It is appended here at Tab B.] You will want Mr. Ford's guidance on how he would like to handle the question of Taiwan's future security, the most preferable timing for establishment of diplomatic relations (if negotiations are successful), and whether or not he would want you to offer the Chinese the possibility of a Presidential trip to Peking to consummate the normalization process (or to have a senior PRC official visit Washington at that time). We suggest the following points be made as you brief the President on the normalization issue:

-- Our past discussions with PRC leaders have brought both sides to the point where consideration of concrete terms for normalization is the key remaining problem in our bilateral relations. Mr. Ford's post-inauguration message to Chairman Mao reinforced expectations on the Chinese side that the U.S. intends to follow through to full normalization by mid-1976 at the latest. If we now avoid addressing this issue we will raise real problems of credibility with Peking. At the same time, if remaining problems cannot be resolved in a way which meets American interests, obviously we will want to reconsider our approach to the question of normalization.

-- Since your trip to Peking last November, when the PRC put into the communique a new phrase saying that normalization should be on the "basis of confirming the principle of one China", we have been getting repeated PRC indications of what that phrase means. If it originally denoted any flexibility on the PRC's part, that flexibility may have disappeared, because the PRC has been saying the normalization must be on "the Japan model" (meaning severance of all official ties with Taiwan). You have moved the dialogue along by your October 2 conversation, in which you pointed out that we have problems that the Japanese did not have. You explained that for a variety of reasons, we would wish to retain a Liaison Office or a Consulate General in Taiwan, and that the security of Taiwan would have to be safeguarded in some way. Thus what you say in Peking on this trip has been foreshadowed by your October 2 talk.

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By JWF Date 9/25/97

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
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-- We believe that the Chinese are not without interest in using U.S. influence on Taiwan to prevent unilateral Taiwan actions that might damage the one-China concept. The PRC should see that continued U.S. ties with Taiwan in a sense serve as a bridge and as a moderating factor on Taiwan's policies and actions. Thus we believe we have some leverage on the PRC in this respect.

-- You intend to present Chinese leaders a package of proposals designed to meet our past understandings about full normalization. These proposals are intended to be consistent with their desire that a normalization agreement "confirm the principle of one China." The elements of the package are: recognition to the PRC as the "sole legal government of China"; establishment of embassies in Washington and Peking; withdrawal of U.S. recognition from the ROC on Taiwan, but with a residual U.S. office in Taipei (either a Liaison Office or a Consulate-General); affirmation of the unity of China by reiterating that the U.S. sees Taiwan as part of China as we expressed it in the Cairo and Potsdam declarations in the 1940s; and an understanding that there will be continuing American access to Taiwan for commercial, social and other such contacts.

-- In return for these elements of an agreement to establish diplomatic relations with Peking and withdraw recognition for Taipei, we will seek some form of PRC commitment to a peaceful resolution of the future status of Taiwan (inasmuch as when we withdraw recognition from the ROC our Mutual Defense Treaty will automatically lapse and the legal basis for the exercise of measures of collective self-defense will disappear). You suggest that we try to get a unilateral and conditional statement from Peking to the effect that as long as Taiwan neither declares its independence from China nor invites in a third power which would threaten PRC security, Peking intends to seek the "liberation" of Taiwan by peaceful means. Such a statement should be reinforced by a U.S. statement that emphasizes the need for peaceful resolution of the status of Taiwan. We would continue U.S. sales of military equipment to the island, although at some



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
limited and probably diminishing level. Such a solution would give reassurance to our allies and to Taiwan that we were not willing to back away from a defense commitment without some compensating arrangement. We believe it would also be acceptable domestically.

-- Doubtless it would be easier domestically if we could negotiate a joint statement with the PRC that would constitute a legal commitment to us of non-use of force in the settlement of the Taiwan problem. We have considered and rejected an approach that would contain such a commitment and thereby create a colorable basis for us to assert that a right of collective self-defense of Taiwan continues to exist. The reasons for our rejection of that approach are set forth in TAB B. You may want to make absolutely sure the President understands that we are proceeding with proposals that will not preserve a legal basis for collective self-defense measures with Taiwan.

-- However, the elements outlined above may not be acceptable to the PRC, and we must consider alternative proposals. We know from past discussions in Peking that the Chinese are most reluctant to commit themselves directly to a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question. They see any effort in this direction as an infringement on their sovereignty. In addition, they probably would have internal political problems with such a position. You will be testing to see what the PRC's reaction is to your first proposal, and where, if anywhere, there may be flexibility in their position, especially on the security of Taiwan. If the PRC is adamant in insisting on all elements of a "Japan model", it might be better to let the matter rest for discussion at a later time, perhaps on your next trip, in 1975.

-- If the PRC shows enough flexibility, and you judge there are reasonable prospects of obtaining agreement on a fallback position, you will consider offering a second alternative. Peking seems inclined toward a statement of great patience regarding the ultimate solution of the Taiwan question. Chairman Mao has said he is willing to wait a hundred years to resolve this issue. Hence, you can consider a fallback position which

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would combine a PRC statement about great patience in resolving Taiwan's future and a unilateral statement on the U.S. side expressing continuing concern that there be a peaceful resolution of this issue. We should also be prepared to continue our military sales program to Taiwan in order to maintain the island's confidence and defense capability and to reassure our allies and our own people. We see two problems with this solution: It looks as if we have left Taiwan vulnerable to a possibly violent fate; and by maintaining an active defense relationship with a "country" we will no longer legally recognize we will not have established a very good basis for future relations with Peking.

-- A final, and least desirable, fallback position would be simply a unilateral U.S. statement that has the effect of supporting the continued security of Taiwan. We do not recommend falling back on this position on this trip.

-- If a normalization agreement can be worked out, there is the question of whether the President would want to visit Peking at some point between the fall of 1975 and spring of 1976 to consummate the establishment of diplomatic relations. Alternatively, we could seek to have the Chinese send a senior leader to Washington to complete the process.

-- You will explore these questions in detail with Chinese leaders given the President's guidance. While you see advantages in trying to conclude an agreement on this trip, if none can be reached because of political differences it may be useful to in effect statemate the talks and pick up the issue on a subsequent visit to Peking, perhaps in the summer of 1975.

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